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4   Editors’ Note
Greetings and a warm welcome to the second issue of Ya Quds!.
Ya Quds! received many good words of encouragement following the first issue. We 
thank all those who have expressed their views and shared their suggestions. After 
all, it is you, our readers, whom we care about, so your comments and suggestions 
are very important to us. We hope that Ya Quds! will continue to offer valuable 
information and stimulate productive discussion about the city of Jerusalem. In this 
issue, as in the first, we did not seek to focus on a particular theme but have rather 
left it to the individual authors to select themes of interest and importance to them. 
All the articles are different, yet all are united by the word “Al-Quds.” Ya Quds! is 
written about and for Jerusalem and its inhabitants, the stories and articles help to 
deconstruct the complex mystery and charm of this city.
What you will find in the following pages is a collection of ten articles, five in Ara-
bic and five in English, written by academics and researchers whose contributions 
we are honoured to have in Ya Quds!. The five articles in English reflect various 
perspectives: historical (The Fatimids in Jerusalem), social (The Gypsies of Je-
rusalem), political (Mussala al-Marwani: An unrecognised Palestinian triumph?; 
and On the 16th Anniversary of the Camp David Negotiations), and urban planning 
(Urban Spatial Changes during Political Uncertainty).
There are so many topics about Jerusalem on which we have yet to hear, so take 
hold of your pens and add your voices. We hereby send out a call for articles for the 
third issue of Ya Quds!. Articles may be in Arabic or English and should not exceed 
1200 words. The deadline for submission is December 12, 2016. We look forward 
to your contributions.
The Centre for Jerusalem Studies team is also working hard to prepare for the 
upcoming conference on Production of Inequalities: Realities and Prospects for 
Change in Jerusalem, to be held on December 3–5 in Jerusalem and Abu Dis. We 
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5  Articles in English
Jerusalem 1994-2016
Urban Spatial Changes during Political Uncertainty 
Scott A. Bollens
Amid continued political impasses over the past 20 years, what have been the 
spatial trajectories of change in Jerusalem? How has the city under partisan oc-
cupation evolved spatially, politically, psychologically, and economically? Based 
on field research in 1994 and more recently from October 2015 to February 2016, 
here is what I have observed.
The stranglehold of Israeli control in Jerusalem continues and has intensified 
over the past 20 years. The regulatory regime remains biased and discriminatory 
against Palestinians. The result is the existence of a de facto binational urban state 
regime, strongly partisan, asymmetric, and unilateral. The city is divided in all 
but name.
People and Israeli Security forces inside Damascus Gate
6There are plans in Arab East 
Jerusalem that are theoretically 
meant to guide development, 
but they are used by Israeli au-
thorities instead to restrict and 
control, with constraints on 
outward growth (blue lines), 
open space, and future urban-
izing designations, and restric-
tions on building volume. Fur-
ther hindrances to Palestinian 
development are land registration requirements that are at odds with Palestinian/
Jordanian land patterns, roads cut through and at the edges of Palestinian villages, 
and designations of national parks to restrict Palestinian growth. 
Israeli planning constitutes a restrictive mechanism that displaces and disempow-
ers Palestinian Jerusalemites. There is a dizzying array of restrictive techniques 
and unspoken obstacles. Multiple layers of obstacles cumulatively result in the 
near impossibility of building. A disingenuous “mask” of technicality and neu-
trality is used by the Israeli system, and there is a mind-numbing planning and 
regulatory jungle full of obfuscation and “double speak”. 
The power of planning lies in its near invisibility. Military actions by Israel are 
obvious, but planning decisions take place on the 5th floor of the Municipality 
Building. Yet, these planning decisions have far-reaching effects on the built land-
scape and inter-group disparities. Planning is a form of “structural violence” that 
creates the enduring structure of an unequal city. The result is that only about 14 
percent of the area of annexed East Jerusalem is where Palestinians are allowed to 
develop, and much of this area is already developed. 
These characteristics are similar to what I observed in 1994 and can lead one to 
despair and frustration over the future of a genuinely shared Jerusalem. Jerusalem 
is an asymmetric, divided city that reflects and reinforces larger power imbalances 
between Israel and Palestine.
There are new features on the ground since 1994 meant to solidify Israeli control 
over Jerusalem and to create greater disparities – the most visible being the sepa-
ration barrier. This barrier was built in the name of Israeli security but in all likeli-
hood is just as much, if not more, a political line – a type of physical manipulation 
The Israeli Settlement of Pisgat Zeev
7of territory to solidify Israeli claims of political control. The barrier cuts off thou-
sands of Palestinian residents from the city, and even cuts into Israel’s designated 
Jerusalem municipal space in a few cases. 
With 18 obstructive and heav-
ily guarded checkpoints in the 
Jerusalem barrier, the barrier 
constitutes fortified space by 
Israel and exposes Israel’s ca-
pacity and willingness to bla-
tantly and visibly manipulate 
space in the name of control. 
This raw edge of the barrier 
is significantly more obvious 
than the more submerged layer 
of planning control and manipulation carried out since 1967.
Another aspect of Jerusalem life that has changed since 1994 is the growing pen-
etration of East Jerusalem Palestinians into West Jerusalem in terms of services, 
employment, and consumption. The lack of services in Palestinian Jerusalem 
means that Palestinians are increasingly needing to use services and spaces of 
West Jerusalem. This is upsetting to certain Jewish neighbourhoods as the identity 
of those using services shifts. Meanwhile, the lack of employment opportunities 
in East Jerusalem has led to a situation where 35,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians 
work in Jewish parts of the city on a daily basis; 65 percent of all construction 
workers in Jewish parts of the city are Palestinian, as are 52 percent of transporta-
tion workers and 75 percent of workers in the hospitality sector. 
On the one hand, this economic interdependence in Jerusalem is consistent with 
Israeli goals of city “unification” in that it strengthens Israeli control, creating 
a subservient and dependent Palestinian population. But, on the other hand, the 
Israeli economy in Jerusalem is now increasingly dependent on Palestinian labor 
and more vulnerable to labor disruption such as might happen due to political 
strife.
Noticeable among the differences in 2016 compared to 1994 is the amount of 
“unlicensed” Palestinian development in Jerusalem and, in particular, the growth 
of Palestinian neighbourhoods on the West Bank side of the barrier but within 
Jerusalem Municipality. These two related phenomena have introduced greater 
A view from Beit Hanina showing an Israeli settlement and 
a Palestinian built-up area
8complexities and contradictions into the 
urban landscape that are not consistent 
with Israeli political objectives. 
Palestinian development of “unli-
censed” housing in Israeli-defined East 
Jerusalem is overwhelming the Israeli 
legal and regulatory system aimed at 
containing and restricting it. According 
to Israeli data, the Arab percentage of 
city population increased from 30 per-
cent of city population in 1995 to 37 
percent in 2013. From 1995 to 2013, 
there were 126,000 new Arab residents 
of Jerusalem compared to 102,000 new 
Jewish residents. The most cited figure 
for the number of unlicensed units in 
Arab East Jerusalem is 20,000, which 
would mean more than 30 percent of 
all Palestinian units in Jerusalem are not authorized by the Israeli state. Seventy 
percent of all new Palestinian construction from 2001 to 2010 is estimated to be 
unlicensed. The magnitude of this type of development is causing problems for Is-
rael. One possible response would be house demolition by Israel of all unlicensed 
housing in Jerusalem. However, this would be politically impossible because Is-
rael cannot destroy large amounts of urban fabric in what they deem “unified” 
Jerusalem as it can in Gaza or, in 2006, Lebanon. 
The forms of Palestinian resistance to Israeli control in the city are both a weak-
ness and a strength. They represent a weakness in that there does not exist a col-
lective and organized strategy – such as would be led by government or pub-
lic-private enterprise – that could build large-scale and integrated development 
projects in the Jerusalem area. Palestinian development in Jerusalem is largely 
residential and suffers from lack of road networks, community and public spaces, 
and economic activities. However, the strength of Palestinian counter-actions in 
Jerusalem is that hundreds of individual and family household actions are, cu-
mulatively, creating a dispersed pattern of unlicensed development activity that 
is harder for Israeli control mechanisms to suppress and restrict. In terms of the 
politically loaded demographic numbers game, this is creating a stalemate that is 
Separation wall, separating Ras Al-Amud from 
Abu Dis
9thwarting the goals of Israeli control.
At times, Israeli actions themselves cause consequences that work against their 
political goals of strengthening their control of Jerusalem. The location of the 
separation barrier in a way that puts the Jerusalem neighbourhoods of Shu‘fat 
Camp and Kufur ‘Aqab outside the wall is paradoxically (from Israel’s view) 
stimulating development in these places. From 2006 to 2010, 20 percent of all re-
corded residential construction in Arab East Jerusalem took place in Kufur ‘Aqab. 
By 2011, of 15 Arab neighbourhoods, Kufur ‘Aqab had the second most square 
meters of built space. Because these neighbourhoods are within the Israeli mu-
nicipality, inhabitants have claims as Jerusalem residents and can count in city 
population numbers. 
Earlier, in the first years of building the barrier around Jerusalem, due to the threat 
felt by many Palestinians of being put outside the wall and losing their Jerusalem 
ID cards, there was significant in-migration of Palestinians from the hinterland 
into the city proper, increasing population numbers. Again, Israel’s own actions 
created consequences that seemed contrary to their political goals of maintaining 
demographic majority as a path toward preserving political sovereignty.
In summary, despite consistent and intensifying Israeli structural efforts to 
strengthen its hold over Jerusalem, the Palestinian presence in and around the 
city (in terms of residential development) is greater today than in 1994. Israel is 
not winning the competition, and the situation represents more of a stalemate. 
This brings into question the ability of any governing regime to “control” a city 
through partisan policy. Forty-eight years of such policies have not gained Israel 
true control over the city. 
Jerusalem appears to an outsider as an unsustainable situation that, lacking politi-
cal resolve, is going to last a long time. Political and material asymmetry creates 
frustration and violence, which creates further consolidation and tightening of 
control by Israel. There exists an unfortunate downward cycle, further perpetu-
ated by a focus on the symptoms of the inequality rather than on the root issues of 
political sovereignty conflict.
Professor Scott A. Bollens is endowed Professor of Peace and International Co-
operation, in the Department of Planning, Policy, and Design at the University of 
California in Irvine. His e-mail address is: bollens@uci.edu.
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Mussala al-Marwani: An Unrecognised Palestinian 
Triumph?
Michael Dumper
In the midst of recent ten-
sions and controversies 
surrounding the access of 
non-Muslims to the Haram 
al-Sharif, observers and re-
searchers may have over-
looked the significance of 
a remarkable achievement 
that has occurred in Jeru-
salem: the restoration and 
rehabilitation of Mussala 
al-Marwani, or the Marwani 
Mosque. The opening of this mosque under the Haram al-Sharif in 2000 may 
have triggered increased Israeli surveillance and intervention on the site but, nev-
ertheless, the work probably constitutes the most extensive and most ambitious 
project undertaken since the Ottoman period. The Marwani Mosque, sometimes 
referred to as the Marwani Prayer Hall, is located in the southeast corner of the 
Haram al-Sharif in an area also known as Solomon’s Stables. It was named after 
the father of the builder of the Dome of the Rock, Caliph Abd al-Malik, although 
some sources question the connection to Calpih Abd al-Malik and prefer to em-
phasize the link with the Crusader use of the site as stables, comprising some 500 
square metres. 
The Mosque itself was created out of subterranean vaults supported by 88 pillars 
and divided into 12 galleries in rows. During the Crusader period the vaults were 
used as stables by the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin II (118-1131 CE) but were 
subsequently sealed off by Salah Ed-Din after his conquest of the city in 1187. 
Between August 1996 and March 2001, the Waqf Administration carried out ex-
tensive rehabilitation work. They also received the cooperation of the Islamic 
Al-Marwani Mosque- View from inside
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Movement inside Israel, 
which mobilised funds and 
supplied Palestinian volun-
teers. The underground site 
was transformed into one of 
the largest mosques in the 
world (4000m²/ 1 acre). On 
the one hand, the work gen-
erated popular Palestinian 
support but, on the other, it 
also provoked widespread 
Israeli opposition, involving running battles with the police, legal petitions by 
pressure groups, and critical reports by the Israeli Antiquities Authority.1 Never-
theless, the rehabilitation work greatly enhanced the standing of both the Islamic 
Movement and the Waqf Administration in the Islamic world.2 
On a tour of Mussalla al-Marwani Halls in February of this year, I was very much 
struck by the achievement of the Waqf Administration in completing this project. 
I have visited the Halls during various phases of excavation and rehabilitation 
and so am familiar with their layout. On this visit, however, which occurred after 
considerable absence, it sunk in what has been accomplished at this site. The gal-
leries inside the Mosque are quite awe-inspiring in their beauty and proportions, 
reminding one of the grace and elegance of the admittedly much more delicate 
mosque in Cordoba in Spain, yet the size and grandeur are quite astonishing. 
I am not a conservation architect or a historian, but surely it is not inaccurate 
to conclude that this project, however contentious, must be the most ambitious 
and most extensive activity 
undertaken on the Haram 
al-Sharif since the Ottoman 
period. I am not aware of a 
project of equal scale and 
magnitude. 
One can see how, in the light 
of all the other recent con-
troversies concerning the 
status quo of the Haram al-
Sharif and the question of 
Al-Marwani Mosque- View from inside
Ceiling of passage in the Al-Marwani Mosque
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access for prayers to non-Muslims, the scale and scope of this work has not been 
recognised. What is astonishing is that such a monumental renovation and expan-
sion of public space for the Muslim community has been undertaken in full sight 
of the Israeli security and antiquity authorities. I would argue that Palestinians 
and the Muslim community have been so focused on the erosion of their control 
over the Haram al-Sharif by the Israeli authorities that they themselves have not 
appreciated what has been achieved. One could argue that failing to portray the 
rehabilitation of Mussalla al-Marwani as a dramatic triumph in the face of the 
overwhelming power of the Israeli state is an opportunity missed to convey this 
example of Palestinian skills, expertise, and competence. 
One could go further. One should also acknowledge that together with the reno-
vation of the Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock in the 80s and 90s (which at-
tracted international acclaim and an award by the Aga Khan Foundation) and the 
renovation work carried out by the Palestinian Welfare Association and the Waqf 
Administration on Mamluk madrasas, turbas, and hamams among other sites in 
the Old City itself (which also received an Aga Khan Award), Palestinian public 
space has made a great deal of progress. In the midst of so many difficulties in 
asserting a Palestinian identity under Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem, these 
are great examples of what can be achieved.
Professor Michael Dumper is Professor in Middle East Politics, University of 
Exeter. He was awarded several long-term research grants and worked on proj-
ects related to the future of Palestinian refugees, conflict in cities, and peace 
initiatives. He has several publications, of which three are on Jerusalem.
Photos in this article are courtesy of Awqaf.
Endnotes:
1. Most notably the Committee for the Prevention of Destruction of Antiquities on the Temple Mount 
and the Temple Mount Faithful; Gideon Avni and Jon Seligman. The Temple Mount 1917–2001: Docu-
mentation, Research and Inspection of Antiquities. The Israeli Antiquities Authority (Jerusalem: Keter 
Press Enterprises, 2001), 42; Nadav Shragai, ‘The Breach of the Temple Mount: a Swift Kick at Jewish 
History’, Ha’aretz, February 12, 1999.
2. See Nimrod Luz, ‘The Glocalisation of al-Haram al-Sharif Landscape of Islamic resurgence and na-
tional revival: Designing memory, mystification of place’ (September, 2009), 1-39. http://www.ntnu.no/
eksternweb/multimedia/archive/00051/Nimrod_Luz_51579a.pdf.
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The Fāṭimids in Jerusalem
         
Nour Abu Assab
 
This article aims to investigate 
whether the Fāṭimids played a role 
in adding new constructions in Je-
rusalem or in affecting its intellec-
tual and social life. The researcher 
consulted historical sources to de-
termine whether the Fāṭimids had 
erected new institutions or con-
tributed to Jerusalem’s cultural ac-
tivities. Before tackling the issue of 
contributions, this paper will begin 
with a brief historical background about the Fāṭimids. 
Jerusalem came under the Fāṭimid rule in 970 CE (Schick 1998, 78) when Jawhar, 
the general of Al-Mu‘izz (reigned 953-975 CE), defeated the Ikhshīdid troops at 
Al-Ramlah (Hitti 1950, 563). In 969, the Fāṭimids conquered Al-Fusṭāṭ in Egypt 
and captured it coming from North Africa, where they had originally established 
their state in 909 CE (Ibn Khaldūn 1999, v. 4, 33; Sanders 1994, 1). It is important 
to mention that the Fāṭimid state (Caliphate) was based on Ismā‘īlism (Ibn Khaldūn 
1999, v. 4, 33; Al-Maqrīzī 2002, v. 2, 597). Ibn Khaldūn says that Ismā’īlism de-
rives from the Twelver Shī‘ism (Ibn Khaldūn 1999, v. 4, 32). So the Ismā‘īlīs were 
Shī‘īs but considered among the extremist sects (ghulāh) (Al-Maqrīzī 2002, v. 2, 
597). The Ismā‘īlīs1 trace their origins to Imām Ismā‘īl, the son and designated suc-
cessor of Imām Ja‘far Al-Ṣādiq (d. 765 CE). Although Imām Ismā‘īl died during the 
life of his father, the Ismā‘īlīs asserted that the Imāmate remained in his line and 
was passed to his son Muḥammad who, as the Ismā’īlīs believe, did not really die 
but went into concealment and would eventually return as Al-Mahdī (the guide) (Ibn 
Khaldūn 1999, v. 4, 33; Sanders 1994, 1).
The Fāṭimids were able to extend their sovereignty, besides Palestine, over Syria, 
Al-Ḥijāz, Yemen, and Sind (Nasr 1977, 235). One of the factors that facilitated the 
Fāṭimids’ control over Palestine was the support of the Byzantines with the involve-
ment of the native local Christians (Peters 1984, 242). Nevertheless, this did not 
Fatimid Engraving. Photo by Mr. Eihab Al-Jallad
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mean that attaining sovereignty over Palestine was an easy task. The Fāṭimid rule 
over Palestine had begun after a long period of warfare between the Fāṭimids and 
their opponents from the Arab tribes, i.e., the Syrian tribesmen of (Banū) ‘Uqayl 
and the Palestinian tribesmen (Banū) Ṭayyi’. The Fāṭimids also fought against the 
Qarmatians, the Turks, and the Byzantines in a continuously changing array of al-
liances. The battle of Ughuwana between the Fāṭimids and the Jarrāhids took place 
in 1029 CE and resulted in the victory of the Fāṭimids (Schick 1998, 78). When the 
Fāṭimids eventually came to rule over Palestine, they safeguarded the gateway to 
the centre of their Caliphate in Cairo (Harris 2005, 68). 
In Palestine, the Fāṭimids continued to rule the country until the Seljūks invaded 
it in 1071 CE. The Seljūks represented the Sunnī Islam in opposition to the Shī‘ī 
Ismā‛īlī Fāṭimids. However, not all the areas came under the Seljūks’ rule, because 
the coastal cities remained in the hands of the Fāṭimids. The Seljūks interrupted 
the Fāṭimid rule in Palestine. To elaborate, after the Seljūk Sultanate had reached 
its widest dimensions, from the borders of Afghanistan to the frontiers of the Byz-
antine Empire in western Asia Minor, and after capturing Aleppo in 1070 CE (Ibn 
Khaldūn 1999, v. 5, 7-11), it pushed into Palestine and captured Al-Ramlah, Jerusa-
lem, and other towns in the south, such as ‘Asqalān (Ibn Al-Qalānisī 2002, 16). In 
1098 CE, the Seljūks again surrendered Jerusalem to the Fāṭimids (Ibn Al-Qalānisī 
2002, 31). Given the previous information, when the Crusaders reached Jerusalem 
in 1099 CE (Hitti 1950, 575), the Fāṭimids were in control of Jerusalem but not all 
of Palestine.
With the arrival of the Crusaders, the Fāṭimid troops had remained in ‘Asqalān, 
which was a seaport (William of Tyre 2003, v. 1, 442) and became the base for 
the fleet for a period of time (Ibn Khaldūn 1999, v. 5, 187), then they withdrew 
westwards to Egypt, the centre of their Caliphate (Ibn Al-Qalānisī 2002, 15). Thus, 
Jerusalem was Fāṭimid for longer than a century, but did this have any impact on the 
architecture and the intellectual and social activities in Jerusalem?    
The travellers’ accounts are considered one of the main sources that help to portray a 
view of the city and its mosque. Khusrū2 (d. 1088 CE), the Persian traveller, reports 
that the Fāṭimids established an “excellent” hospital “bimaristan” and a mosque at 
the “edge” of Hinnom Valley. According to Khusrū, a great number of sick people 
was served at the hospital, which was funded by considerable sums given for the 
healing of the sick, affording fixed salaries for physicians. In this regard, many en-
dowments were made to keep the hospital working (Khusrū 1993, 68).  
Al-Maqdisī’3 (d. 990 CE), the geographer and traveller, also testifies as to the pros-
perity of the city when he reports that the city was well looked after under the 
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Fāṭimids. It could be argued that there was much interest in the structure of the city 
as well. In this regard, Al-Maqdisī’ mentions that the city was built professionally 
(Al-Maqdisī 1877, 166). Under the Fāṭimids, Jerusalem was a large city with a very 
clean market, rich in goods and crafts. Economically, Jerusalem appeared to be a 
suitable place for visitors because its prices were moderate and plenty of fruits and 
vegetables were offered for sale (Khusrū 1993, 67). 
Al-Aqsa Mosque appeared to be at the heart of the Fāṭimids’ interest. Al-Maqdisī 
points out that Al-Aqsa Mosque was at that time the greatest in the Muslim world 
(Al-Maqdisī 1877, 166). The Fāṭimids’ interest can be seen from the amount of 
restoration they pursued. For example, in 1016 CE, an earthquake resulted in dam-
age to Al-Aqsa Mosque; the Dome partly collapsed and part of Dāwūd pulpit fell 
down (Al-Ḥanbalī v. 1, 443). Al-Ẓāhir rebuilt what was damaged by that earth-
quake in 1022 CE. In 1033 CE, another earthquake shook Jerusalem, affecting the 
Mosque and the walls of the city, so they were rebuilt in the same year (Asali 1990, 
118). The Fāṭimid caliphs tended to have their names commemorated in Al-Aqsa 
Mosque and in Jerusalem. One example mentioned by Khusrū is an inscription that 
honoured the Sultan of Egypt (the Fāṭimid Caliph4), which was set over a great 
gateway5 and crowned with a dome (Khusrū 1993, 70). 
The Fāṭimids seem to have highly regarded Al-Aqsa Mosque. Under their rule, peo-
ple from all over Palestine and the Levant came to visit the Mosque during the time 
of pilgrimage in cases where performing a pilgrimage to Mecca was not affordable. 
Khusrū also says that at times as many as 20,000 Muslims came to Al-Aqsa with 
their families during the first 10 days of Dul Ḥijjah,6 and some made sacrifices at 
the terrace of the Dome of the Rock for the Al-Adḥa Feast (Khusrū 1993, 68). This 
suggests that the Fāṭimids paid much attention to Jerusalem, as the aforementioned 
ritual had exclusively been performed in Mecca. The Fāṭimid Caliph granted spe-
cial attention to the Dome of the Rock, in particular, and that motivated the Caliph7 
to send a huge silver lantern, as well as a huge perfumed candle, to decorate the 
Rock. And in order to gain the honour, the Caliph’s name was carved in gold around 
that candle. In addition, Al-Ghūrī, an influential Fāṭimid figure, erected a position at 
the southern part of the Dome that could be reached by three ladders and that led to 
a passage and windows where he commemorated his name (Khusrū 1993, 80–82). 
The Fāṭimids’ interest expanded to the surroundings of the walled city, i.e., to the 
Al-Sāhirah area. The people at that time believed that this would be the area of Res-
urrection and awaiting accountability on the Day of Judgement, so they stayed there 
until the end of their life (Khusrū 1993, 68), which would suggest a flourishing and 
prosperous area due to the huge number of residences.   
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The presence of the Christians, who most probably included pilgrims and visitors, 
appears to be obvious. Al-Maqdisī, without differentianting between the citizens 
and the travelers, tells that Jerusalem had many Christians, assuring that their num-
ber was so large that they were the majority (Al-Maqdisī 1877, 167). The common 
presence of non-Muslims is also mentioned in Khusrū’s account, as many Chris-
tians and Jews from “the Roman Area,”8 came to visit Jerusalem and venerate its 
great church and synagogue (Khusrū 1993, 67). As the city was accustomed to 
having visitors and strangers, it appears to have offered many accommodations. In 
addition to the pilgrimage accommodations previously mentioned, the city also had 
hostels to accommodate visitors, which Al-Maqdisī argued to be expensive (Al-
Maqdisī 1877, 167). Mentioned by Runciman is the fact that, inside Jerusalem, pil-
grims could stay at the Hospital of Saint John, which was founded by the merchants 
of Amalfi (Runciman 1991, 48). Al-Douri comments that with visitors and pilgrims 
comes much activity in crafts and trade (Al-Douri 1990, 118). 
Thus economic activities flourished under the Fāṭimids. In this regard, there were 
numerous artisans, and each craft had a separate bazaar (Khusrū 1993, 67). The 
general observations of Al-Maqdisī and Khusrū show that the city was well suited 
to having visitors and pilgrims, as it was clean, large, and offered plenty of goods 
and fruits. 
Strangely, Al-Maqdisī mentions in his book that Jerusalem had few Muslim schol-
ars (‘ulamā’) (Al-Maqdisī 1877, 166). This might be due to the different beliefs the 
Fāṭimids adopted, for they were Isma‘īlis, while the Muslims of Jerusalem were 
Sunnis. The difference in ideology prompted the Fāṭimids to seek their own edu-
cational institution, so they established Dār Al-‘Ilm to propagate Ismā‘īlī thought 
(Asali 1990, 117). However, although the number of scholars declined, Al-Aqsa 
remained the destination of Muslim worshippers, who came to visit, then stayed 
for longer periods (mujāwirūn), particularly inside the Dome of the Rock (Khusrū 
1993, 80).
To conclude, the work carried out by the different Fāṭimid caliphs indicates that 
the Fāṭimids were not less keen than previous dynasties had been in asserting the 
sanctity and Islamic significance of Jerusalem. Therefore, new institutions were 
erected, and special attention was paid to Al-Aqsa Mosque. However, adopting the 
Ismā‘īlī thought appears to have negatively affected the number of scholars and 
the intellectual activities inside Al-Aqsa Mosque, which nevertheless remained a 
destination for visitors and mujāwirūn . 
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Dr. Nour Abu Assab received her PhD and master’s degree in Islamic Jerusalem 
Studies from Aberdeen University. She also received a master’s degree in Arab and 
Muslim History from Birzeit University in Palestine. Her background is in English 
language, as she graduated from Bethlehem University.
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On the 16th Anniversary of the Camp David Negotiations:
How Ignorance of Jerusalem’s Importance to Palestinians 
Doomed the Talks
Shibley Telhami
July 2016 marks the 16th anniversary of the start of Camp David negotiations be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians, mediated by the United States. The resulting failure 
reversed years of incremental advances in bridging the gap between Israelis and 
Palestinians and put an end to a period of hope that the conflict was on its way to 
resolution. No single issue was more responsible for the failure than that of Jeru-
salem.
As pointed out in my 2013 co-authored book, The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest 
for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (with Daniel Kurtzer, Scott Lasenksy, William 
Quandt, and Stephen Spiegel), 
there is near consensus among scholars as well as participants from all three 
sides that the primary reason for the collapse of the negotiations at Camp Da-
Junction between Sultan Sulaiman Road and Road number1
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vid was the issue of Jerusalem, even if other important issues such as refugees, 
borders, and Israeli settlements remained unresolved. This was particularly 
ironic as Jerusalem was the single issue over which there was no previous 
discussion or any serious preparation – not that the centrality of the issue was 
unpredictable. It is also striking how the American team had limited informa-
tion about the Palestinian or the Israeli bottom line positions, particularly with 
regard to Jerusalem.
It isn’t that the American 
team wasn’t hearing some 
outside views that Jerusalem 
was central to the Palestin-
ians; it is that there was a cer-
tain degree of disbelief and 
dismissal, at the same time 
that American officials fully 
accepted that the Israelis, di-
vided as they may be, were 
unified on the issue of Jeru-
salem, with no serious open-
ness to compromise, so they looked for compromise elsewhere. Clinton’s National 
Security adviser, Samuel Berger, described the sentiment after a dinner he had in 
Israel just two months before the Camp David conference this way: “I don’t know 
about Yossi Beilin, but everybody at that dinner said ‘Jerusalem is a red line which 
no Israeli prime minister can cross, and if he does, he’ll be out of office”. There was 
no such sense about the Palestinian position on Jerusalem. As a senior Clinton Ad-
ministration official told the authors of the Peace Puzzle: “You certainly had that in 
terms of sensitivities to the Jewish, Israeli views; you didn’t have that on the other 
side. I don’t know who in the State Department or elsewhere could’ve done that”.
To my mind, Jerusalem has always been central. I was reminded of this in a direct 
way in 1991, during a meeting in Tunis with the late Palestinian leader, Yasser 
Arafat. I had gone to visit as part of a small delegation of the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences, which was engaged in Track II mediation efforts following 
the 1991 Gulf war. I asked Arafat if he agreed with the sentiment that the PLO had 
been significantly weakened after the Iraq war, after losing support from the Gulf 
Arab states and angering the sole superpower just as the Cold War ended. Not sur-
prisingly, Arafat didn’t much agree with this narrative, but as he spoke, it seemed 
he was aware that his counter-arguments appeared half-hearted to his listeners. He 
paused, straightened up in his seat, then wagged his finger insistently as he deliv-
A view of the old city of Jerusalem
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ered his trump card: “don’t forget, I still have Jerusalem!”.
At the time of the Camp David talks, I was close to the American negotiating team, 
not only because I knew well many of its members, but also because I had been 
appointed on the American side of the Anti-Incitement Committee that was cre-
ated after the Wye River agreements. I conveyed my views to both White House 
and State Department officials, before the Camp David Summit commenced, that 
Jerusalem was central to the Palestinians. In addition, I went to the press. Just days 
before the negotiations I published an article on July 14, 2000, in the Los Angeles 
Times, in which I wrote:
By “Jerusalem,” both Israelis and Palestinians refer largely to the Old City 
within the ancient walls that houses the most significant holy sites for Jews, 
Muslims and Christians. The symbolism evoked by these sites cannot be over-
come by creative ideas of expanding the city’s boundaries. This symbolism is, 
in some ways, bigger than the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because it ultimately 
mobilizes Jewish and Muslim groups from outside the areas controlled by Ara-
fat and Barak. Emotions run high on both sides when the issue of Jerusalem 
sovereignty is raised. When pollsters asked Palestinians if they agreed to Is-
raeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem in exchange for Palestinian statehood 
in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza, an overwhelming majority rejected the 
Palestinian state if it did not include Jerusalem … In the Arab and Muslim 
worlds, no issue with Israel mobilizes more people. Jerusalem is celebrated 
and invoked in political, religious and social rallies. The rhetoric in the Arab 
world on this issue has intensified since the success of the Islamic Hezbollah 
operations forced the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The dual message of 
militancy and religion has been put forth as an alternative to negotiations. 
Giving Israel sovereignty over the walled city would rally groups across the 
region against the deal. Unlike a powerful Egypt, which was able to withstand 
a decade of isolation in the Arab world for its 1978 Camp David deal with 
Israel, Arafat is too weak to prevail without substantial Arab nation support.
As the Camp David started, my fear grew that the Jerusalem issue would doom the 
negotiations. During the first week of the negotiations, I followed up with another 
article on July 21, 2000, in the Washington Post, in which I wrote: 
It is no secret that many people on the U.S. and Israeli negotiating teams ar-
rived at Camp David assuming this about the Jerusalem issue: If Yasser Arafat 
was offered a state in more than 90 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza 
and some control over Muslim holy sites and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusa-
lem, he would be willing to accept Israeli legal sovereignty over the old city. It 
is hard to know how this impression was formed when conventional wisdom 
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among most students of Arab and Palestinian politics was to the contrary. It is 
certainly the case that one never truly knows the absolute bottom line of the 
other party until it is tested in negotiations, and it is always worth trying to 
push the limits. But the likelihood that there was much Palestinian flexibility 
on this issue of Jerusalem was always small, if one listened attentively to both 
sides.
My warnings fell on deaf ears.
Since the failure at Camp David we have learned how unprepared the American 
team was about the issue of Jerusalem, which ended up taking up the lion’s share 
of the negotiations and ultimately dooming them. As my co-author and I noted in 
the Peace Puzzle, “the absence of preparation on Jerusalem became clear early on 
with the frantic attempt to draft a non-paper. It also became clear that the leadership 
needed to be brought up to speed quickly on conceptualizing different approaches 
to the Jerusalem issue and for that, the team turned to Jonathan Schwartz,” a State 
Department legal adviser, to “educate” the leadership about Jerusalem sovereignty 
issues in the middle of the negotiations.
The story of how the Jerusalem issue was taken up at Camp David is now well doc-
umented in our book, as well as many others, though with some variation. Part of 
the irony was that in fact more progress was made on this issue than was achieved 
in all the years of the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians – just not 
enough for an all or nothing summit.
The last time I met with the late Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was during his 
last visit to Washington in January 2001, at the Ritz Carlton hotel where he was 
staying. I asked him about Jerusalem and about reports on what the Israelis had 
offered and what he had reportedly offered. Specifically, I asked him about reports 
that he had “offered” the Armenian Quarter to Israeli sovereignty. His answer was 
this: “They asked, but I replied that ‘my name is Yasser Arafatian!’ ”
Jerusalem of course wasn’t the only issue, and it is still difficult to assess if an 
agreement to end the conflict would have been possible in 2000, even if the issue 
of Jerusalem were settled. What is clear is that there was no way to have a final 
agreement without addressing Jerusalem. On this, nothing has changed since: The 
Jerusalem issue remains a key to any settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Prof. Shibley Telhami is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of 
Maryland, and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has served as senior 
adviser to the United States Department of State and to the United States Mission 
to the United Nations.
22
The Gypsies of Jerusalem: The Forgotten People
Amoun Sleem
A band of itinerant musicians and dancers hired 
by a Persian king? A caste of entertainers, com-
missioned to defend their homeland against a 
Hunnish invasion in the 5th century? Or a num-
ber of tribes sent out to Persia to a Turko-Persian 
general, never to return again? How and when 
did the Gypsies begin their migration, and how 
did they end up in Jerusalem of all places? In the 
early 18th century, historians established that the 
Gypsy people originated as a caste of entertain-
ers in India who called themselves Dom, which 
meant “man” in their common language. The 
Dom of Jerusalem are one of the many commu-
nities of Gypsies who have settled throughout 
the Middle East. Like the Roma and Lom, their 
European and Armenian counterparts, the Dom 
have a consciousness that is both uniquely Gypsy 
and heavily influenced by their host countries. Amidst the theories gleaned from 
historical records concerning the cause of their departure from India, the Dom of 
Jerusalem offer a legend that roots them firmly in the Middle East.
Long ago, two tribes led by two cousins resided in Syria. One cousin, upon killing 
the King, incited the wrath of the King’s daughter. Seeking revenge, the grieving 
princess turned the two tribes against each other and instigated a war between them, 
resulting in the death of both cousins. The princess was not satisfied, however, and 
issued a decree forcing the tribes to wander through the wilderness during the hot-
test hours of the day, to ride only donkeys, and to earn their living solely through 
dancing and music making. From there, some Dom travelled to India, Iraq, and 
even back to Syria. By acknowledging Syria, not India, as their ancestral home-
land, the Dom altered the nature of the “man” to which their name refers in favour 
of a Middle Eastern identity. Today, the Dom live in several countries throughout 
the Middle East, and their culture has melded with that of the surrounding Arab 
environment.
As did the Gypsies in other countries, the Jerusalem Dom accepted the language 
and religion of the places they lived in. They are Muslims and speak Arabic as 
well as Domari – their native language. Domari is distinct even among the other 
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major Gypsy languages, Romany and Lom. Its close links to Punjabi were key 
determinants of the Gypsies’ distant Indian heritage, yet Arabic’s significant effect 
on the language speaks to the impact of the Dom’s latest homeland. Whatever their 
adaptations in religion, language, or otherwise, Gypsies all over the world maintain 
a principal character that is singularly their own, and the Dom are no exception.
The Gypsies of Jerusalem remain a community infused by musical rhythms and 
song in keeping with Gypsy tradition but have abandoned their nomadic habits in 
favour of a more sedentary lifestyle. They have made their home in Jerusalem for 
over 400 years. Originally settling in an area outside the Old City called Wadi Al-
Joz, the Dom later moved to a small neighbourhood called Burj Al-Laqlaq within 
the walls of the Old City. An ethnic minority, the Dom community has suffered in 
silence throughout the decades of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their numbers dwindled 
significantly during the battles surrounding the foundation of the State of Israel. 
The greatest exodus occurred during the war of 1967, which caused nearly half of 
the Dom population to seek refuge in Syria, Lebanon, and even India. 
Despite a deep-seated identification with Middle Eastern culture, the remaining 
two hundred families endure severe discrimination at the hands of Israelis and their 
Palestinian neighbours. Once lauded in Persian poetry as unparalleled entertainers, 
a series of cultural, political, and economic shifts have led the Dom to be regarded 
as despicable beggars. The shame of being a Gypsy is instilled at an early age when 
children enter school. Although the Dom consider themselves Palestinian, their 
non-Arab ethnicity elicits such intense abuse that nearly 60% of the Dom commu-
nity has failed to complete elementary school. Unskilled and uneducated, the Dom 
are locked into a cycle of dire poverty and derision. The younger generation now 
prefers to assimilate fully into the surrounding Arab culture, spurning traditional 
dress, the Domari language, customs, or anything else that might distinguish them 
as Gypsies. 
The Domari Centre in East Jerusalem was established to stem the deterioration 
of this once vibrant community and to restore its pride. Founded in 1999, the or-
ganization provides the traditionally underserved, minority population with eco-
nomic empowerment, child development, women’s support, and cultural preserva-
tion. Members of the community, primarily women and children, come for classes, 
training programmes, advice, and assistance. The Domari Centre takes particular 
care to rebuild the self-esteem of its youngest members, offering a child literacy 
programme, Domari language and culture courses, and new school supplies. The 
hope is that their little hands will eventually lift the Gypsies of Jerusalem out of the 
“untouchable” status from which they suffer through education and self-respect.
Amoun Sleem is a leader in the Gypsy community of Jerusalem and director of the 
Gypsy Community Center in Shu’fat, promoting the Gypsy history in the Middle 
East.
24
